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1. Introduction:  
The Metaphysical Subject 
as a Corporal Reality
Karol Wojtyła approached ethics 
through an  enduring interest in 
man’s fundamentally personalist 
nature.1 His ethical study had two 
objectives: to characterize the per-
sonalist subject as an agent of ethi-
cal activity and as an end for the pursuit of the good, that is, as a value 
contingent locus. His interest in validating ethical praxis thus fell outside 
the pragmatic question of the manner of its practice, meaning that it fell 
within a sphere more properly characterized as metaethical.
Although Wojtyła distinguished both objectives conceptually, he rec-
ognized that this distinction did not imply their mutual independence. 
Linking these two, he argued, was the experience of morality that man-
ifested itself in action. Understood as the ground for value contingency 
 1 Cf. K. Wojtyła, Man in the Field of Responsibility, Vatican City 1991, passim.
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in the person, the capacity for the performance of  the ‘good’ thereby 
established the personal agent as a value locus.
The reality of the person inheres in morality, that morality is a thoroughly spe-
cific and connatural reality with respect to the person – with respect precisely to the 
person and only to the person […] man as a man, becomes good or evil through 
the act. 2
As a metaethical object for the evolution of ethical praxis, thus, the 
capacity for morality validated the wholly referential status of the person.
It was in view of this referential status, that is, as a meta domain that 
defined and determined ethical praxis in inquiry and practice, that the 
objective reality of the person could be normatively qualified. Holub3 
points out that in Wojtyła’s specific exploration this reality was consti-
tuted in the phenomenal subject, that is, in the specific sphere of reali-
ty that defined the unique interiority and operativity of the individual. 
Wojtyła’s emphasis on the phenomenal subject, accordingly, is reminis-
cent of distinctively modern elements such as consciousness and self 
awareness and a performative dimension that originates from within 
a personal ‘someone,’ hence belonging to no other. However, by invoking 
a Thomistic metaphysical deduction, he goes beyond this exterior and 
phenomenal expression to forge a link to an inner and integral unity, 
a  ‘humanum suppositum,’ for which the expressed dimension is only 
one manifestation. By this integral unity he meant a metaphysical sub-
jectivity that grounded the objective, epistemological reality of the per-
sonalist subject. Karol Wojtyła’s personalism thus drew, as he claimed, 
from a philosophy of ‘genuinely metaphysical range’4 where the person 
‘constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and so with 
metaphysical inquiry.’
 2 K. Wojtyła, Man in the Field of Responsibility, op. cit., p. 17.
 3 Cf. G.  Holub, The Human Subject and its Interiority: Karol Wojtyła and the Crisis 
in Philosophical Anthropology, “Quien” 4 (2016), p. 47–66.
 4 Cf. G. Holub, The Human Subject and its Interiority…, op. cit., p. 47–66.
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For ethical praxis this conception is significant in linking the sub-
ject’s dynamical operativity not solely, or merely, to a collection of phe-
nomenal events, but to  an integral and unique subject. Accordingly, 
it is fundamentally constitutive for ethics. What Wojtyła offers, there-
fore, is a metaphysical justification for ethical praxis, and an explora-
tion of those modalities that would be normatively qualified through 
this metaphysical link. Burgos has specifically identified the object 
of Wojtyła’s exploration with personal subjectivity:
what Wojtyła is searching for is a reelaboration of Thomistic gnoseology that 
considers the advances of modernity and mostly the possibility offered by the phe-
nomenology of directly accessing the subjectivity of the person.5
Such a characterization, indeed, reflects the phenomenal emphasis 
of Wojtyła’s personalist exploration; however, it nonetheless fails to con-
sider other manifestations that are metaphysically anchored, since his 
metaphysical subject is  neither purely phenomenological nor wholly 
structured by the phenomenal dimension. In fact, the humanum sup-
positum both extends and confirms the possibility for exploring a mul-
tiplicity of other modalities that may constitute its predicates, and that 
do not rely on such a unimodal manifestation. This extension allows 
Wojtyła to move beyond the purely phenomenological to other dimen-
sions of the subject.
Crucially, as Holub points out, the humanum suppositum bridges 
and integrates alternative manifestations that are constitutively present, 
thereby subordinating these also within the ethical sphere.
The subject is not a sequence or stream of psycho-physical events taking place 
in the human individual. Rather it must be characterized by a metaphysical struc-
ture, which precedes all acts and happenings.6
 5 Cf. J. M. Burgos, The Method of Karol Wojtyła: A Way Between Phenomenology, Personalism 
and Metaphysics, “Analecta Husserliana” 104 (2009), p. 110.
 6 J. M. Burgos, The Method of Karol Wojtyła…, op. cit., p. 110.
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The metaphysical structure therefore also anchors physical attrib-
utes of  the person, especially of  the nervous system, which is  widely 
invoked as the physical substrate for the phenomenal subject, and where 
questions of  praxis have been classed in  the domain of  neuroethics.7 
By  identifying the subject as a metaethical principle, that is, as a val-
ue contingent object, he  thus extends, by  virtue of  the metaphysical 
unity of  the person, value to  all those attributes that constitute the 
subject. Indeed, this metaphysical inference enables Wojtyła to  cau-
tion in Veritatis Splendor ‘against a manipulation of corporeity which 
would alter its human meaning […]’ on grounds that the ‘[…] nature 
of  the human person is  in the unity of body and soul […] that stand 
and fall together […]’8a clear indication that he regarded the corporal 
manifestation to be subsumed within the metaphysical concept of the 
suppositum, which thus acts to  validate an  ethical praxis within the 
corporal sphere. Indeed, Wojtyła’s recognition of the fundamental par-
ticipation of  the corpus in the integral unity of  the human is also ev-
ident in  his opus Man and Woman: He Created Them: A Theology 
of the Body,9 a position expressed in more nascent form in Montini’s 
Humanae Vitae10 that is probative for technological interventions cir-
cumventing the generation of biological life. In the logic of the meta-
physical argument the suppositum can be expected, therefore, to anchor 
neuroethical praxis concerned with the impact of neural intervention 
on the specifically human meaning of life.
The utility of the metaphysical dimension to neuroethics thus emerg-
es from its link to the specifically corporal contribution made to the unity 
of the person, that is, as a physical structure that is enabling to a human 
 7 Cf. P. Reiner, The Rise in Neuroessentialism, in: The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics, eds. 
J. Iles, B. Sahakian, Oxford 2011, p. 161–176; N. Levy, Neuroethics and the Extended Mind, in: The 
Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics, op. cit., p. 285–294; A. Roskies, Mental Alchemy, http://www.the-
neuroethicsblog.com/2016/08/mental-alchemy_23.html (23.08.2016).
 8 Cf. John Paul II, Pope, The Splendor of Truth = Veritatis Splendor: Encyclical Letter, Boston 
1993, no. 50.
 9 Cf. John Paul II, Pope, Man and Woman: He Created Them. A Theology of the Body, trans. 
M. Waldstein, Boston 2006.
 10 Cf. Paul VI, Pope, Humanae Vitae. Encyclical Letter, Vatican City 1968.
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ontological, subjective and integrative order. As such its utility to neu-
roethical praxis devolves from the fundamental participation of  the 
corporal manifestation in structuring the ontological unity of the indi-
vidual. By extension, this corporal contribution may be used to assess the 
validity of metaphysical presuppositions of other, modern neuroethical 
variants. These points are taken up in the following discussion.
2. The Humanum Suppositum and Ontological Integration
As a metaphysical structure that precedes all acts that are its mani-
festation the humanum suppositum enters into every physical act, sus-
taining it by virtue of making present an integral order that it confers 
on the person.11 Through its entry into these acts, therefore, it  is also 
a dynamical participant in  them. What is of even greater significance 
is  that by  entering into these various dimensions, the metaphysical 
subject shapes them according to  an expressed personal subjectivi-
ty; hence, it  also molds the neural architecture, which expresses this 
manifestation corporally. Wojtyła is  therefore able to  claim that the 
human body
has been created to transfer into the visible reality of the world the mystery hid-
den from eternity in God, and thus to be a sign of it12
that is, the human body physically manifests an  originary, meta-
physical reality subsisting in a unitary and personalist subjectivity that 
is ordered to  the performance of  the good. Value contingency in  the 
metaphysical and personalist subject is thereby linked to the corporal 
form that manifests it.
 11 Cf. G. Holub, The Human Subject and its Interiority…, op. cit., p. 47–66.
 12 Cf. John Paul II, Pope, Man and Woman…, op. cit., passim.
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2.1. Transference of the Metaphysical Subject into Visible Reality
For a  neuroethical praxis, the humanum suppositum is  a  reali-
ty accessed first through the phenomenal subject’s objective, corporal 
manifestation,13 that is, it is first understood at the epistemological lev-
el of the phenomenal subject, and only then at the metaphysical one. 
Significantly, its dependence on the epistemological level does not imply 
its absence in the order of being. If so, the phenomenal subject would 
be reduced to one manifestation among a collective, consisting of a va-
riety of dynamisms, and not linked to an overall unity. The epistemo-
logical understanding of the subject is thus revelatory for the Wojtyłan 
metaphysical conception, which thereby situates within its sphere the 
corporal form of the neural dynamic. This dynamic, consequently, is un-
derstood to be shaped according to the pattern of the humanum supposi-
tum to yield, that is, to transfer into physical reality, the uniquely human 
subject; hence, it identifies the neural dynamic as a normative terrain 
to be “charted” for probative concerns.
Metaphysically, the humanum suppositum is seen, first, in its evo-
cation of the human entity, that is, the neural architecture is unified op-
eratively. As a metaphysical prior of the phenomenal subject, therefore, 
this evocation elicits the adoption by the corporal form of an organiza-
tional order characterized by operational confinement and underpinned 
by a systemic and dynamical configuration that is needed for autono-
mous living. This unitary dynamic, for instance, is a fundamental fea-
ture acted upon by evolution. As evolutionary philosopher Cliff Hooker 
points out14 it is the activity of the whole organism that interacts with 
the environment and the whole organism that is molded by evolutionary 
pressures, which thereby acquires behaviors that are good for it. Likewise, 
such self initiated actions presuppose a holistic organizational order, that 
is, a source for their emergence. Philosophers of biology Maturana and 
 13 Cf. G. Holub, The Human Subject and its Interiority…, op. cit., p. 58. 
 14 Cf. C. Hooker, Interaction and Bio-cognitive Order, “Synthese” 166 (2008), p. 513–546.
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Varela15 and Moreno and Mossio16 propose, in consequence, that the 
autopoetic capacity of living organisms – understood as the organismal 
ability to produce themselves – can be present only if organisms are 
purposed to autonomous existence as integrated, operational, and topo-
logically distinct wholes. They evidence this purposing in pointing to the 
recursive restructuring used to sustain autonomy in the face of ongoing 
thermodynamic constraints. Autonomy, thereby, constitutes a capacity 
for existence that can only be exercised as an entity.
However, since autonomy is also a condition of state, it can be exer-
cised only through certain dispositions, which act, therefore, as qualifi-
ers for autonomous entities. For humans, these include self governance, 
agency, and a behavioral repertoire enabling a capacity to resist con-
straints imposed by one’s environment. These dispositional qualifiers 
therefore evidence, secondly, the contribution of the humanum supposi-
tum to the ontological shaping of the phenomenal subject and the neural 
architecture that sustains it. The consolidation of a neural architecture 
underlying the self percept, for example, illustrates a metaphysical con-
formity of the whole ontological dynamic to the unity transcendental. 
Contingent properties that emerge from the neural architecture, includ-
ing those that contribute to the phenomenal subject, such as reasoning, 
consciousness, agency, and identity, predicate from the self, that is, they 
display independent manifestations and so possess neural circuitries dis-
tinguishable from that of the self, though nonetheless subsumed to its 
oversight.
The subject’s corporal manifestation is thus not autonomously de-
termined but is shaped by an extrinsic order that is determinative for 
its expression. Indeed, the natural biological order shares this subordi-
nation to an immaterial prior, an observation often used to explain why 
living processes assume unique configurations rather than merely how 
 15 Cf. H. R. Maturana, F. Varela, De maquinas y seres vivos. Autopoiesis: La organizacion de lo 
vivo, Santiago de Chile 1979.
 16 Cf. A. Moreno, M. Mossio, Biological Autonomy: a Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry, 
Berlin 2015.
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they do so, that is, explananda classed as design principles.17 Such princi-
ples are useful for explaining the metaphysical contribution to cognition. 
They explain, in the first place, why only certain organizational arrange-
ments enable cognitive operation, that is, they explicate the need for 
cognition to adopt a particular order. Kelso,18 in a prescient commentary, 
remarks that while nature’s forms are abundant, its principles are few, 
and carefully preserved, meaning that the design of living systems is nei-
ther arbitrary nor haphazard. Indeed, numerous studies now document 
the adoption of such design principles in the construction of complex 
biological systems, an illustration that only certain preferred operational 
forms can be used, and so are, necessarily, widely adopted. For example, 
gene regulation networks in cells are constructed of a handful of recur-
ring circuit elements, each of which can carry out specific dynamical 
functions autonomously,19 or, similarly, cases of cellular networks that 
resonate in unison in a performance space.20 What these studies em-
phasize is  the apparent universality of  the deployment of  successful 
designs. Design principles, accordingly, are instantiated by living organ-
isms because they constitute valid principles of operation on which the 
dynamic order of living organisms needs to be grounded for successful 
performance.
By extension, such principles help to explain why cognition needs 
to exhibit a unified operation and why its qualifying properties, in turn, 
need to be configured as predicates of an autonomously directed entity. 
The instantiation of attractor motifs in neural network operation, for 
example, constitutes a revealing design feature for brain activity since 
it shows that such motifs are linked to the system wide, neural network 
 17 Cf. P. Braillard, Systems Biology and the Mechanistic Framework, “History and Philosophy 
of the Life Sciences” 32 (2010) no. 1, p. 43–62.
 18 Cf. S. Kelso, Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior, Cambridge 
1995.
 19 Cf. U. Alon, An Introduction to Systems Biology, Design Principles of Biological Circuits, Boca 
Raton 2007, p. 1.
 20 Cf. Y. Hart, Y. Antebi, A. Mayo, N. Friedman, U. Alon, Design Principles of Cell Circuits with 
Paradoxical Components, “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 
of America” 109 (2012) no. 21, p. 8346–8351.
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activity of the brain; hence, it reveals the presence of constraints that 
subsume these motifs within a holistic form. Friston makes the pertinent 
comment here that
our exchanges with our environment are constrained to  an exquisite degree 
by  local and global brain dynamics and that these dynamics have been carefully 
crafted by evolution, neurodevelopment, and experience to optimize behavior.21
A significant issue raised by these explanations is then how the bi-
ological order depends on such extrinsic influences, that is, how meta-
physical constraints influence the materially manifested form seen in the 
neural architecture. Explanatory accounts for cognitive order, accord-
ingly, need to be concerned with the nature of this relationship, both its 
origin and the manner by which constraints on the instantiated order 
are imposed. Michael Morange22 offers one explanation, arguing that 
the imposition of such constraints is due to physical laws that establish 
limits on outcome. He points, for instance, to allometric scaling laws 
that establish physical dependencies between different properties of an 
organism such as metabolism and size. Yet Morange’s physical explana-
tion begs the question for the existence of such a physical ordering; thus 
it cannot be the sole basis on which to explain the why question for the 
order of neural operation. This explanatory insufficiency can be seen, 
for instance, in Yi et al’s study of integral feed back, which shows that 
only this type of recurrency can achieve resonance.23 While Yi’s study 
demonstrates a  physical and causal effect mediated by  one element 
on another, it also shows that the effectiveness of this operation is not 
itself solely a consequence of a physical dimension. What is critical here 
is the presence of feedback connections and an organized composition 
 21 Cf. K. Friston, Free Energy and Global Dynamics, in: Principles of Brain Dynamics, eds. 
M. I. Rabinovich, K. J. Friston, P. Varona, Boston 2013, p. 269–292.
 22 Cf. M. Morange, Les Secrets du Vivant: Contre la Pensee unique en Biologie, Paris 2005.
 23 Cf. T. M. Yi et al., Robust Perfect Adaptation in Bacterial Chemotaxis Through Integral Feedback 
Control, “Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America” 97 (2000), 
p. 4649–4653.
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in which the elements are circularly arranged. These latter features are 
abstract, that is, they are non-physical characteristics that nevertheless 
have a bearing on performance. By extension and for this reason, recur-
rency in neural network operation, among other cognitive features, has 
at once both a physical and an immaterial dimension.
Non-physical influences are also evidenced in the large scale formal 
order of cognition, like the brain’s integrated performance amidst the 
complexity of the neural architecture, as well as in small scale order, like 
the dynamical attractors mentioned by Friston. Because the material or-
der is subsumed to these immaterial features the latter can be regarded 
as a supraphysical influence effecting their material instantiation. The act 
of instantiation thus means that the material dimension, in a formally 
causal sense, is subordinate to an influence that is universally pertinent, 
exteriorized, and supraphysical and so is determinative for the adopted 
topology.24
It is in the context of this supraphysical influence on cognition that 
Wojtyła’s introduction of  the humanum suppositum is  relevant. That 
is, it  is only through the metaphysical order that the neural architec-
ture is  shaped according to  the ontological form of  the phenomenal 
subject. This shaping is not merely a matter of the neural architecture 
adopting one among a variety of forms, that is, the adoption of an ar-
bitrary hylomorphic expression, but it is the specific acquisition in the 
epistemological order of  the phenomenal subject, as  Wojtyła points 
out. This metaphysical association thus anchors the objective reality 
of  the phenomenal subject in  an immaterial one that is  ontologically 
generative. Indeed, the phenomenal subject shares with the humanum 
suppositum its relational orientation toward being, seen, for example, 
in the evolutionary trend toward knowledge acquisition and dynamical 
freedom.25
 24 Cf. C. Gillett, Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy, Cambridge 2016, p. 2. 
 25 Cf. N. Clark, Person and Being, Marquette 1993, p. 36.
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2.2. Ontology and Integration: the Physical Object  
of Neuroethical Praxis
From Wojtyła’s metaphysical conception, accordingly, there emerges 
the key issue for neuroethical praxis, the manner by which the supposi-
tum physically structures the personalist subject, both in the unification 
of its dynamical operativity and in its generation of an ontological order. 
Inferences about the contribution of the suppositum to the physical or-
dering of the personal subject must begin, then, with the a priori recog-
nition of the dynamic reality that integrates and unifies the personalist 
subject, that is, the metaphysical ground that structures the objective 
reality that is manifested through the corporal entity. By contrast, the 
absence of such a unifying dynamic, that is, the specific neglect of an 
a priori metaphysical structure, seen, for example, in cognitive ontology 
accounts,26 otherwise leaves neuroethical praxis inchoate without either 
a contingent locus for value or a medium for conducting it; hence, it nul-
lifies neuroethics as a normative science grounded in a unifying dynam-
ic. While ethical theories of phenomenal connectivity are yet invoked 
(Parfit), they run counter to the observable manifestation of purposeful 
unity noted by Kant, empirically manifest in evolution, and, increasingly, 
detected in the neurosciences. It is, therefore, by grounding the corporal 
contribution to the manifestation of the personalist subject in a meta-
physically unified structure that a Wojtyłan approach can specifically 
contribute to an ethical praxis on biomanipulations of  the neural ar-
chitecture and its operativity. From these considerations it is apparent 
that metaphysical conceptions on configured entities are key to under-
standing such normative concerns, that is, they are the key metaethical 
dimension needed for the evolution of praxis in neuroethics.
Nonetheless, due to the empirical nature of assessments on a spe-
cifically corporal contribution to ontology, their clarification of neural 
design remains ongoing and needed for the proper evolution and refine-
ment of ethical praxis. This is to say, that empirical and philosophical 
 26 Cf. A. Roskies, Mental Alchemy, op. cit.
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study on the form of the neural architecture is an essential clarification 
of the working out of the metaphysical subject in its material dimension. 
This clarification encompasses two aspects: the mediation of 1) ontolog-
ical primacy in the manifestation of the personalist subject and 2) the 
operational integration of  the corporal entity. It  is in the former that 
contemporary neuroscience can inform the identification and charac-
terization of  the corporal features needed to manifest the personalist 
subject but it is only in the second that we can delimit their role to its 
holistic expression. In  fact, existing evidence suggests their mutual 
interdependency.
Through this dialectic it is possible to see how Wojtyła’s conception 
assists in clarifying the specifically corporal role that the neural archi-
tecture exercises in structuring the phenomenal subject. In identifying 
the ontological and integrative, neural attributes it becomes possible, 
in particular, to identify the corporal features of the neuroarchitecture 
that qualify as a normative terrain; hence, their determination can be ex-
pected to facilitate the construction of neuroethical norms for which 
a ‘corporal manipulation – directed either to neurorehabilitation or oth-
er purposes – that alters its specifically human meaning’ would be proba-
tive. They are, nonetheless, subject to continuing conceptual and empirical 
refinement.
As an ongoing revelation, this neural contribution can only be inti-
mated here, but existing studies offer a portrait consilient with Wojtyła’s 
metaphysical conception. These studies begin to show, notably, that the 
performative integration of the corpus is mediated ontologically by what 
is often referred to as a self construct, in a manner conceptually analogous 
and illustrative of the Wojtyłan humanum suppositum. Significantly, the 
instantiation of self circuitries very likely occurs in an evolutionary and 
performative context; hence, metaphysical constraints effecting their 
embedding shape self circuitries in the context of the integration of both 
brain and body;27 hence, value contingencies rest in the whole human 
 27 Cf. C. Hooker, Interaction and Bio-cognitive Order, op. cit., p. 513–546; L. Smith, Stability 
and Flexibility in Development, in: Toward a Unified Theory of Development, eds. J. P. Spencer, M. S. 
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entity, and not solely, though predominantly, in  the neural processes 
used to evoke its perceptual realization. What is of value, then, is the 
ontological and systemic organization of the human in his embodied 
context; specifically, the neural architecture is privileged through its role 
in mediating this integration.
In keeping with much evidence the body is  intrinsically involved 
in assisting the brain in constructing the manifestation of the subject.28 
A hierarchical layering of dynamical neural elements is framed by the 
exchange between the two that involves the reciprocal and mutually de-
pendent flow of information effected between brain regions, like that, 
for example, of the hippocampus and the distributed sensory and motor 
neural network that lies beyond the brain. This relationship is necessarily 
constrained by the dynamical nature of brain activity, which is contin-
uous, and the need for stability, which remains the cornerstone of the 
brain’s dynamical operation. Hence, built into the dynamical layering 
is a predisposition to create coherent and unified structures that can 
carry out the grander tasks of the neural architecture.
Interestingly, evidence for such coherence has come from studies that 
explore the lack of certain cognitive capacities rather than their presence, 
as, for example, the demonstration of perseveration in infants.29 Such 
studies reveal, thereby, the need for a holistic organization, since in its 
absence a dynamical unity cannot be exercised. In the case of infant per-
severation, for instance, cognitive processing of the body’s disposition 
in space is needed to relate the individual to the events of the world. This 
is to say that the whole body is needed to create a stable and coherent 
image that can be interactively and cognitively positioned in motor plan-
ning. Indeed, identity and self awareness both appear to be linked to this 
embodied dimension.30 Intentional acts in developing infants to either 
stand upright or to crawl, for instance, effect a differential brain map-
C. Thomas, J. L. McClelland, Oxford 2009, p. 67–85; D. Corbetta, Brain, Body, and Mind: Lessons 
from Infant Motor Development, in: Toward a Unified Theory of Development, op. cit., p. 51–56.
 28 Cf. S. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford 2005, p. 5.
 29 Cf. L. Smith, Stability and Flexibility in Development, op. cit., p. 73.
 30 Cf. D. Corbetta, Brain, Body, and Mind…, op. cit., p. 51–56.
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ping depending on the performative act intended, such as the acquisition 
of bimanual skills with the corresponding coupling of sensori-motor 
areas. This observation reveals that task performance is related to the 
linkage made between the goal and the individual for whom the goal 
is intended, which is to say that intentional performance requires a stable 
representation of the individual that can be cognitively perceived and 
physically mobilized as a whole. Such examples, show a needed, holistic 
and bodily contextualized, self representation for performance that can 
be employed in a wide variety of interactive and dynamic circumstances. 
Hence, they are ethically significant for beginning a process of charting 
unifying corporal features, that is, neural correlates, which outline a neu-
roethical terrain.
3. Metaphysical Presuppositions in Modern Neuroethics
Significantly, most modern meta neuroethical approaches, with no-
table exceptions, acknowledge the individual to be a central value locus, 
as does Wojtyła’s ethical personalism. Nonetheless, differences among 
metaphysical presuppositions about the individual significantly affect 
the understanding of value contingency, and the praxis that devolves 
from them. Meta-ethical principles that shape modern neuroethical 
praxis are therefore strongly influenced by their metaphysical under-
standing of the world, which in turn determines value contingency and 
ethical praxis. These deviate significantly from a Wojtyłan personalist 
ethics that is oriented to preserving the human meaning of the corpus.
Given the plurality of a priori, metaphysical presuppositions that in-
fluence modern neuroethics, their reconciliation with Wojtyła’s huma-
num suppositum can be expected to be partial and in cases unattainable. 
Nonetheless, such modern meta-principles are heavily influenced by the 
Cartesian understanding of reality, itself a derivative of Aristotelian and 
Thomistic syntheses, which is  presupposed in  Wojtyła’s suppositum. 
Hence, these modern presuppositions share a conceptual foundation 
with Aristotelian metaphysics, the dominant conception of the natural 
world, which is characterized by individuated entities that are qualified 
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by their predicates.31 While Whiteheadian process metaphysics has been 
invoked in  this century to explain temporally extended, processional 
events, increasingly the recognition that processional events themselves 
comprise operational features of larger dynamical entities is accepted, 
that is, their diachronic temporality is subsumed within a synchronic 
and dynamical organizational order that is characteristic of living organ-
isms, particularly of their neural operativity.32 The increased acceptance 
of this conception33 exposes lacunae in underlying premises on ontic 
adequacy that have come to challenge Cartesian metaphyics and that 
are likely to mold new formulations that conciliate better with a broader 
and a more synthetic conceptual approach that has traditionally been 
associated with Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics. This is to say 
that the epistemological observation of the neural architecture may itself 
offer a bridge for revising Cartesian presuppositions that mark modern 
neuroethics and that may serve as nuclei of a neuroethical ‘rapproch-
ment.’ Indeed, the link between reality and conceptual understanding 
recapitulates the classical Thomistic and pre-Vicoan formulation of the 
truth transcendental,
‘Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus’ that is, ‘truth is the correspondence of the 
mind to reality.’34
3.1. Being and the Phenomenal subject in Modern Neuroethics
Descartes’ res cogitans is generally regarded as the first conception 
of the isolated subject, an entity that performs cognitive acts like think-
ing, willing, or feeling.35 This subject is capable of cognition independent 
 31 Cf. M. Esfeld, Quantum Enganglement and a Metaphysics of Relations, “Studies History 
Philosophy Modern Physics” 35 (2004), p. 601–617.
 32 Cf. W. Bechtel, Explicating Top-down Causation Using Networks and Dynamics, Oxford 2017.
 33 Cf. R.  Laughlin, Physics, Emergence, and the Connectome, “Neuron” 83  (2014) no. 
6, p. 1253–1255.
 34 D. R. Lemieux, She is Our Response, New Bedford, MA 2011.
 35 Cf. G. Holub, The Human Subject and its Interiority…, op. cit., p. 47–66.
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of its association with a body, that is, it  is distinguished by its purely 
phenomenal structure. Despite its bodily independence it nevertheless 
can know itself uniquely and differentiate itself from all other thinking 
and willing entities. In creating this subject Descartes effected a meta-
physical divorce, separating immaterial from material reality. Heidegger 
points out that by taking the ground of reality to be the autonomous 
subject Descartes effected a fundamental shift in the relationship be-
tween existence and the subject, separating the subject from existential 
being and subordinating all other modes of being to its autonomy. That 
is, subjectivity became determinative for existence, and autonomy its 
normative standard.36
Locke later adopted the Cartesian subject as a mode for metaphysical-
ly conceiving of the human person. As in the case of the Cartesian sub-
ject the Lockean person is characterized by an experiential dimension,
the person is the same if he is aware of himself in different places and different 
times […]37
which is to say he is self defining. Unlike Descartes’ res cogitans, how-
ever, Locke’s person is neither strictly independent of the body nor one 
in substance with it and is, therefore, purely epistemological, where the 
subject is known only experientially by the phenomenal knowledge of its 
presence. In the Lockean person, metaphysical association with being 
is never directly linked to an existence that is prior to the experience. 
The Lockean metaphysical person is therefore loosely, and in cases large-
ly, independent of an entity of the sort that is preeminent in Cartesian 
thinking.
Significantly, the Cartesian separation of the subject from its mate-
rial manifestation has also effected a third manner of conceiving of the 
 36 Cf. B. Onishi, Information, Bodies, and Heidegger: Tracing Visions of the Posthuman, “Sophia” 
50 (2011) issue 1, p. 101–112.
 37 Ryan A. Piccirillo, The Lockean Memory Theory of Personal Identity: Definition, Objection, 
Response, http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1683/the-lockean-memory-theory-of-perso-
nal-identity-definition-objection-response
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relationship between these two metaphysical domains that now domi-
nates current metaphysical approaches to the subject in neuroscience. 
In  this third manner the ontological dependence of  the subject rests 
in an exclusively material order. Historically, the Cartesian emphasis 
on efficient causality created the materialist conception of reality that 
dominated Comtean positivism and has since yielded the modern episte-
mological substitution of fact for ontology. Positivism has been pursued 
in the neurosciences since the seminal work of Ramon de Cajal with its 
promotion of the neuron doctrine and a reductionist mechanical op-
eration. ‘Cognitive ontology’ accounts, for example, thus now view the 
phenomenal subject as the perceptual realization of a series of neural 
events.38
Though subject to considerable scrutiny and challenge in modern 
and post-modern philosophy, particularly in its empirical demonstra-
tion, both the Cartesian res cogitans and the Lockean person/self yet 
exert a potent influence on current metaphysical presuppositions that 
affect the understanding of the individual and the neuroethical praxis 
that devolves from their conceptions, as does the modern materialist 
view of reality.
3.2. Metaphysical Presuppositions and Modern Neuroethics
Metaphysical presuppositions that influence contemporary nor-
mative accounts of  the subject extrapolate directly from one of  these 
three metaphysical approaches, or  some combination thereof, affect-
ing, thereby, the manner by which value contingency is accorded the 
neural architecture. Contemporary philosophical currents influenced 
by the conception of the Cartesian subject include transhumanism and 
posthumanism39. In these trends the autonomy of the isolated subject 
is normatively privileged, meaning that their chief normative concern 
is the freedom of willing of the subject ego. Since value is segregated 
 38 Cf. A. Roskies, Mental Alchemy, op. cit.
 39 Cf. N. Bostrom, In Defense of Posthuman Dignity, “Bioethics”19 (2005) no. 3, p. 202–214. 
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from the material body, that is, no  longer contingent to  it, the body 
can be availed for manipulation according to the demands of the ego. 
Posthumanist currents, like that of Nick Bostrom, perceive in this value 
the normative basis for the freedom to refabricate the body and brain 
according to perceived standards of perfection, one whose reevaluation 
is ongoing. In consequence, in these understandings the body becomes 
re-presentable, that is, it is no longer determinative for what is repre-
sented, and so no longer an objective reality that constitutively possesses 
being. In effect, the legitimacy of partial plasticity validates wholesale 
change, making the body, theoretically and potentially, indefinitely 
malleable. Independent of  the body’s unique form, human ontology 
becomes equated with its description, thereby converting information 
from an epistemological metric to an ontological resource and depriving 
being of substance. As Onishi notes:
The technological advancements proposed by transhumanists aim to reduce all 
material entities to patterns of information in order to have the freedom to arrange 
and re-arrange them at an anatomical level40
Modern philosophies premised on Lockean person, such as extended 
mind theory (EMT), impersonalism, and ecoethics, for example, while 
sharing with the res cogitans a primacy of ontology in the conscious 
and willing subject, are nonetheless distinguished from it by their loose 
association with the subject’s corporal substratum; value contingency 
is thereby associated with the physical reality of the person but is not 
confined solely to this locus. By maintaining a metaphysical link between 
the subject and his corporal reality, the direct manipulation of the body’s 
material order is probative. However, the possibility of invasive interven-
tion in the neural structure is normatively permitted by virtue of the sub-
ject’s extended and pluralistic associations, which are no longer bound 
to a single entity. This is due to  the dissociation introduced between 
being and metaphysical entities and being and value that is characteristic 
 40 Cf. B. Onishi, Information, Bodies, and Heidegger…, op. cit., p. 101–112.
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of the Lockean subject and is adopted in functionalist interpretations 
of human behavior, like that expressed in Andy Clark’s Extended Mind 
Theory (EMT).41 In EMT this instantiation extends to devices that are 
used to accomplish the same functions that are performed cognitively, 
that is, the mind is understood to be localized within the set of objects 
that carry out a cognitive task, rather than just within the brain. Since 
value contingency is thereby distributed beyond the individual, a posi-
tion explicitly recognized in Neil Levy’s ascription:
If something outside the head plays much the same role in cognition as  that 
within the head, then – given the truth of functionalism – it should be ascribed the 
same status as it would were it in the head42
actions which can permissibly be done on such ‘objects’ in isolation, 
hence, are normatively permissible within the brain.
The metaphysical logic of the Lockean subject is hyperbolically ex-
tended in Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics, which prioritizes 
being over form. By decoupling the relation between being and human 
entities the order of value is extended indefinitely to all other objects43 
thus overcoming the logic of binary subject/object distinctions. By uni-
versally extending value contingency, therefore, the central importance 
of the human being is also negated, that is, anthropocentrism is over-
come. The logical trajectory to reductio ad absurdum of value parity 
between subject and object is seen in Bruno Latour’s kingdom of ends44 
where human value is  invested equivalently throughout the whole 
of the ecological network45. Thus, the essential danger of Heidegger’s 
foreclosure of the order of being with form lies in the fulfillment of the 
 41 Cf. N. Levy, Neuroethics and the Extended Mind, op. cit., p. 286.
 42 Cf. N. Levy, Neuroethics and the Extended Mind, op. cit., p. 292.
 43 Cf. G. Rae, Heidegger’s Influence on Posthumanism: The Destruction of Metaphysics, Technology, 
and the Overcoming of Anthropocentrism, “History Human Sciences” 27 (2014) no. 1, p. 51–69.
 44 Cf. B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, Cambridge 1993.
 45 Cf. D. Chandler, The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and 
Necessity, “Millennium Journal of International Studies” 41 (2013) issue 3, p. 516–534.
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metaphysical trajectory begun by  Locke, where individuated being 
is precluded. This has the significant normative consequence of yielding 
wholly ‘impersonalistic’ value architectures, an inversion that fully de-
constructs anthropocentrism and, ultimately, dematerializes the human 
entity.
The Cartesian influence that has resulted in materialism, by contrast, 
has resulted in the mind’s loss altogether as an immaterial reality. This 
reductive and epistemological understanding thus also precludes met-
aphysical approaches to realist conceptions of the subject as an entity, 
hence also the possibility of unitary construals governed by integrating 
principles. In  the absence of ontological primacy and broader causal 
notions the conception of  integration can no  longer explain physical 
organization at the progressively complex scales observed in living sys-
tems, an approach adopted in neuroessentialism and cognitive ontology.
In neuroessentialism the brain thereby constitutes the sole value 
contingent object.46 Likewise in cognitive ontology, a conception of the 
human faculties broadly adopted in the neurosciences, such faculties 
are functionally and collectively interpreted rather than subordinated 
to a  systemic and ontological, coordinating principle. In  the absence 
of such a unitary construal value contingency can neither be centered 
in the human entity nor is there the possibility of the ontological prima-
cy of the subject in neural operation. In consequence, all organization-
al arrangements within and beyond the individual share value parity. 
In praxis, normative parity may, therefore and for example, be extended 
across a continuum of human machine hybrids, thus ethically permitting 
their construction at all scales of hierarchy and complexity.
4. Seeking a Common Metaphysical Platform  
with Wojtyła’s Personalist Subject
For Wojtyła, the critical dimension of metaphysics situates the eth-
ics of the personalist subject, where the person ‘constitutes a privileged 
 46 Cf. P. Reiner, The Rise in Neuroessentialism, op. cit., p. 165.
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locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical inquiry.’ 
In the Wojtyłan formulation the normative value of the personalist sub-
ject thus emerges from its metaphysical and immaterial mooring, consti-
tuting the essential metaethical dimension for neuroethical praxis, and 
a guarantor of existential perseverance.47 In other words, by designating 
the personalist subject a constitutive value locus, Wojtyła is stating that 
the metaphysical unity of the subject intrinsically determines the manner 
of acting toward the corporal manifestation, and so grounds his claim 
against ‘dehumanizing’ corporal intervention; thus it has a direct bearing 
on the construction of ethical standards that are probative, that is, the 
construction of normative statements that pertain to actionable stand-
ards that would or would not infringe on a specifically human meaning.
In prevailing models of the subject that are a legacy of Cartesian met-
aphysics, however, the specifically human meaning of the personalist 
subject, that flows from his ontological primacy in the order of being, 
is challenged. As Gillett points out, what is evident in current debates 
over the nature of material reality is precisely the extent to which the 
Cartesian imposed segregation of immaterial and material dimensions 
of reality suffice for ontic adequacy, that is, whether materialism alone 
or dualism offer adequate explananda to account for the material order. 
This imposition has repercussions in the ethical sphere. The Cartesian 
understanding of  metaphysics, for one thing, has largely foreclosed 
a conceptual approach to neuroscience that is linked to entity concep-
tions, the metaphysical ground that is, a priori, the precondition for the 
personalist subject. The normative consequences of this foreclosure con-
tinue to impact neuroethical praxis and leads, increasingly, to dehuman-
izing tendencies.
How metaphysics grounds ethical praxis, then, is a critical dimen-
sion often ignored in debates about human nature and its modification, 
that are exacerbated by the advent of neuro and genetic technologies. 
Human nature is typically conceived in terms of its propertied features 
alone. This has the normative consequence of severing the individual 
 47 Cf. N. Clark, Person and Being, op. cit., p. 8.
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as a metaphysical entity from the performative dimensions of his acts. 
Such division dominates, for example, in perceptual accounts of person-
hood and human nature such as John Locke’s perceptual account of per-
sonal identity and its modern derivatives. Indeed, this anthropological 
conception has been the source of impersonalistic models that deprive 
the individual of normative value.
Presuppositions invoked in such debates cloud normative conclusions 
by assigning value contingency exclusively to the material dimension 
of the individual. They therefore structure debates solely in the context 
of  their epistemic character, which is  to say that only the knowledge 
of the physical world is used to inform its ontological dimension; hence, 
debates are reduced thereby to valuations of current vs prospective an-
thropologies, with their corresponding normative assumptions that are 
solely epistemically framed. Such presuppositions do not account for 
a physical order that is immaterially informed and metaphysically con-
ceived, a failure that is the basis for ontological inversions that compro-
mise the neuroethical proscriptions they are intended to invoke.
Significantly, while empiricist approaches to  epistemology since 
Descartes have yielded a wealth of detail on the inner workings of nat-
ural order, they have offered no conceptual bridge to a realist source 
of material integration. In a pointed reference to this disarray nobel lau-
reate Robert Laughlin opined both the need and appearance of a new 
era of synthesis, which he claimed was evidenced in the discovery of the 
quantum hall effect in 1984.48
The disarray is especially evident in conceptions about the neural ar-
chitecture and operation, often invoked as the material substrate for the 
human mind. Mechanists like Carl Craver49 and John Bickle,50 particu-
larly, remain committed to a world causal order characterized by Bunge’s 
 48 Cf. R. Laughlin, A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down, Cambridge 
2005, p. 74.
 49 Cf. C. Craver, Physical Law and Explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley Model of the Action 
Potential, “Philosophy of Science” 75 (2008) no. 5, p. 1022–1033.
 50 Cf. J. Bickle, Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit 
in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience, “Synthese” 151 (2006) no. 3, p. 411–434.
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efficient causal sequences and exemplified by Hodgkin Huxley action 
potential paradigms. Yet, as William Bechtel points out, efficient causal 
sequences require that formal organizational order be also invoked in ex-
plications of dynamical hierarchies, a point argued by emergentists like 
El Hani on the novel and irreducible properties that make their appear-
ance at successive levels of order51 Still others point to the evidence of syn-
thesizing principles that are seen in the dynamic forms of living systems.52 
The culmination of the multi-staged metaphysical divorce that has tran-
spired since Descartes, however, efficient causal and mechanistic com-
mitments instead drive the prevailing materialism of modern, megascale, 
neuroscience programs that have recently begun in America (BRAIN), 
Europe (HBP), and Asia, leaving a decompositional and reductive phi-
losophy to determine how brain operation is interpreted for the foresee-
able future. Hence, the presuppositions invoked by these efforts belie the 
consilience with neuroscience that is more evident in Wojtyła’s proposal.
Crucially, the need to  account for the emergence of  subjectivity 
from the material order, that is the hallmark of the neural architecture, 
is left unexplained by the Cartesian metaphysical segregation. In an ef-
fort to explicate its emergence philosopher Thomas Nagel53 proposes 
that mind already imbues the natural world, a philosophical conces-
sion to the absence of metaphysical explananda for a subjectivity, which 
is nevertheless evidenced by the material order. The ferment in current 
efforts to explain the reality of the brain and mind, moreover, indicates 
that modern metaphysical presuppositions that undergird neuroethics 
are also in a process of flux. The current uncertainty surrounding the 
metaphysical status of  subjectivity, therefore, suggests that openings 
to the Wojtyłan metaphysical subject may pass by way of new epistemo-
logical revelations on the objective reality of the subjective mind. The 
conundrum introduced by  neuroscience, rather than presenting ob-
 51 Cf. J. Quieroz, C. El Hani, Towards a Multi-Level Approach to the Emergence of Meaning 
Processes in Living Systems, “Acta Biotheoretica” 54 (2006) no. 3, p. 179–206.
 52 Cf. F. Capra, P. L. Luisi, A Systems View of Life, Cambridge 2014, p. 130.
 53 Cf. T. Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature 
is Almost Certainly False, Oxford 2012.
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stacles to reconciliation, therefore, may instead confront the Cartesian 
metaphysical segregation at its root, revealing the material dependence 
of the neural architecture on an immaterially informed order. Indeed, 
the epistemological access gained through the neurosciences is  itself 
a  revelation not only of  an immaterial order but an  order grounded 
in an ontological primacy that is situated in the metaphysical subject, 
as Wojtyła proposed.
5. Conclusion
Numerous neuroethical quandaries today mark concerns over the 
normative propriety of corporal intervention in the nervous system. 
At the center of the debates is the question of how the human subject 
is understood. Accounts influenced by Cartesian metaphysics separate 
the subject into his immaterial and material manifestations, yielding 
ethical approaches that devalue the body and the neural architecture. 
Contemporary neuroscience, on the one hand, proposes that the subject 
is a purely physiological creation, whereas posthumanism privileges the 
isolated ego on the other; both, thereby, validate an arbitrary neuroethical 
praxis. Karol Wojtyła’s siting of the personalist subject in a metaphysical 
structure, where the subject predicates from an ontologically propertied, 
entity, instead invests the body with value, yielding a principled praxis. 
In this direct challenge to Cartesian influenced neuroethics, Wojtyła pro-
poses a fundamental corrective to the metaethical principles that ground 
modern neuroethics; that is, the intrinsic value of the neural and physical 
reality of the person rests in the link to the metaphysical unity of the imma-
terial subject, brought into visible reality through its material expression.
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Abstract
Framing Neuroethical Praxis: Wojtyła’s Metaphysical Subject and 
its Modernist Cartesian Variants
Numerous neuroethical quandaries today mark concerns over the normative pro-
priety of corporal intervention in the nervous system. At the center of the debates is the 
question of how the human subject is understood. Accounts influenced by Cartesian 
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metaphysics separate the subject into his immaterial and material manifestations, yield-
ing ethical approaches that devalue the body and neural architecture. Contemporary neu-
roscience, on the one hand, proposes that the subject is purely a physiological creation, 
whereas posthumanism privileges the isolated ego on the other; both, thereby, validate 
an arbitrary neuroethical praxis. By anchoring neuroethics in the metaphysical subject 
Wojtyła proposes a fundamental corrective to these metaethical approaches, and the 
promise of a new praxis for corporal intervention in the brain.
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